In ‡ation targeting as practiced by the Bank of England has undergone several changes since its adoption in 1992, including rede…nition of the goal, measures to increase transparency and the granting of independence to the central bank. These changes are likely to have a¤ected long-run in ‡ation expectations and perceptions of future in ‡ation risk. To that end, this paper estimates a no-arbitrage, a¢ ne, factor model of the term structure of in ‡ation compensation in the United Kingdom. The model yields time series of expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation risk premia at short and long horizons estimated in a theoretically consistent manner. The results reveal that long-run in ‡ation expectations drifted down slowly during the …rst …ve years of in ‡a-tion targeting, but in ‡ation risk premia moved down abruptly only once the Bank of England was granted independence. This event, which arguably signalled more credible commitment by the central bank to its in ‡ation anchor, appears to have been more important in shaping in ‡ation expectations and perceptions of in ‡ation risk than changes in the de…nition of the target or measures to increase transparency.
Introduction
In ‡ation targeting conducted by the Bank of England has undergone several changes since its adoption 15 years ago. A quantitative goal for retail price in ‡ation was …rst announced in October 1992 and was subsequently rede…ned several times, from a range to a point target, …rst asymmetric then symmetric. More recently the goal was lowered in tandem with the shift of the target measure to consumer price in ‡ation. Amidst these changes, the Bank of England was granted independence to pursue its in ‡ation goal and measures were taken to increase the Bank's transparency. These adjustments were aimed at fostering greater public understanding and credibility of the central bank's goals. How, then, have they in ‡uenced in ‡ation expectations and perceptions of in ‡ation risk?
This paper turns to …nancial market data to answer that question, taking advantage of the long history of in ‡ation-indexed debt issued by the government in the United Kingdom to estimate a no-arbitrage, a¢ ne factor model of the in ‡ation compensation term structure.
The gap between the nominal and real term structures represents the compensation that investors receive to hold nominal rather than real government debt and is comprised of expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation risk premia. The term structure model returns time series of expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation risk premia at short and long horizons. Long-run in ‡ation expectations inferred from the model line up closely with those from surveys of professional forecasters, but unlike surveys, the model can be …tted to high-frequency data. Risk premia are estimated in a theoretically consistent manner within the model rather than as a residual after observing expectations.
Disentangling in ‡ation expectations from in ‡ation risk premia matters to monetarypolicy makers. In ‡ation expectations are an important input to the policy decision process, and …nancial markets provide real-time information about the expectations of a broad range of agents. As a barometer of in ‡ation uncertainty in the broader economy, …nancial markets are able to quickly convey information that the central bank may need to factor into its deliberations, perhaps requiring the central bank to clarify its policy actions or reiterate its commitment to its long-run goal. Understanding when rising in ‡ation risk premia re ‡ect upon the credibility of the central bank or re ‡ect broader macroeconomic sources of in ‡ation risk matters to the conduct of policy.
The empirical results indicate that market participants'long-run expectations of retail price in ‡ation trended down from 1992, but not until after the Bank of England was granted independence did they approach and then remain close to 2.5 percent. In ‡ation risk premia showed little sign of declining until 1997, when they dropped abruptly in the months following independence. This event, which arguably signalled more credible commitment of the central bank to its in ‡ation objective, appears to have been more important in shaping in ‡ation expectations and in ‡ation risk than changes to the de…nition of the target or measures to increase transparency, such as publication of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) or releasing details of internal forecasting models.
Following independence, expected future in ‡ation and in ‡ation risk premia remained low and fairly stable, until the in ‡ation target measure was rede…ned in December 2003 from retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) to consumer prices (CPI).
Since the announcement of the new CPI in ‡ation target, risk premia on retail price in ‡ation outcomes far into the future have risen 30 to 40 basis points above the range of the preceding decade. Moreover, much of the increase in in ‡ation risk premia was concentrated in the weeks immediately following the switch to the CPI target.
Why did rede…ning the target raise in ‡ation risk premia? This can be better understood by noting that in ‡ation-indexed government debt in the United Kingdom is linked to the retail price index (RPI). In the long run, beyond the typical monetary policy cycle, forecasts of RPI and RPIX tend to coincide and their trend rates of growth are similar. But RPI and CPI outcomes are less correlated and the gap between them has been persistent at times. Disbanding the retail price in ‡ation anchor arguably increased the compensation that investors required to hold long-run retail price in ‡ation risk. This is not to say that the Bank of England became less credible in its commitment to controlling in ‡ation; rather, it illustrates the role that an in ‡ation anchor plays in moulding perceptions of future in ‡ation risk.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the no-arbitrage, a¢ ne, factor model used in the paper, deriving the general asset-pricing condition and outlining the model assumptions. An overview of the data is also given. Section 3 discusses issues regarding estimation and presents the results for the sample at hand. Section 4 uses the output of the model to investigate how markets have responded to changes in the Bank of England's in ‡ation targeting policies and Section 5 concludes.
A no-arbitrage factor model of in ‡ation compensation
This paper adapts a no-arbitrage, a¢ ne, factor model to the term structure of in ‡ation compensation, a novel application of a standard …nance model. The model is based on three key assumptions: i) assets are priced by a single discount factor such that no arbitrage opportunities remain in trading in ‡ation compensation at di¤erent maturities, ii) the dynamics of the in ‡ation compensation term structure can be well described by three latent factors, and iii) the discount factor used to discount returns is log-normal. In other words, yields are essentially a¢ ne in the three factors.
Related research has modelled the nominal and real term structures jointly, imposing the restriction that the same three factors describe both term structures and the in ‡ation process. (See Risa, 2001 , for an application to the United Kingdom and D'Amico, Wei, 2006, and Wright, 2005 for applications to the United States.) One advantage of modelling the term structure of in ‡ation compensation directly, as is done here, is to avoid such restrictions on the factors and instead estimate those factors and parameters that best …t the data. This does not imply that the factors underlying the in ‡ation compensation term structure are uncorrelated with those underlying the nominal or real term structures.
On the contrary, the factors may indeed covary but I do not impose restrictions about the nature of that covariance. Another reason to model in ‡ation compensation rather than real and nominal rates (jointly or separately) is to bypass concerns about structural change in the equilibrium real interest rate.
Finally, the purely latent-factor approach to modelling the yield curve used here and elsewhere is more ‡exible than models that employ observable macroeconomic factors, such as Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2006) and Rudebusch and Wu (2004) . While the inclusion of observable factors lends greater interpretability to the results, it also leads to a deterioration in overall …t and greater concerns about misspeci…cation.
Pricing of in ‡ation-contingent assets
The model builds upon a fundamental asset-pricing condition. Begin with the familiar condition for pricing nominal bonds,
where M N t is the continuous-time stochastic discount factor (SDF) used to price the gross nominal return on a bond from t to t + n, R N n;t . The nominal stochastic discount factor, M N t ; and the real stochastic discount factor, M R t (which prices real bonds) are linked via the price level, Q t ,
We can express equation (1) in terms of the price of a zero-coupon nominal bond that pays $1 at time t + n and thus has a gross return of R N n;t = 1=P N n;t
Rewriting equation (3) in terms of the nominal yield, y N n;t = 1 n ln P N n;t = y R n;t + e n;t + n;t
where
Intuitively this states that in ‡ation compensation, the spread between nominal and real yields, is compromised of an in ‡ation expectation, e n;t , and an in ‡ation risk premium, n;t (including a Jensen's inequality term).
Thus we can write down a general asset pricing condition for in ‡ation compensation.
The in ‡ation compensation yield spread, y IC n;t = y N n;t y R n;t , can be viewed as the yield on a synthetic in ‡ation bond that pays $1 at time t + n. This bond will have price P IC n;t , where P IC n;t = exp n:y IC n;t = exp n( e n;t + n;t ) :
This can in turn be rewritten as a more familiar general asset pricing condition,
where M IC t is the stochastic discount factor that prices in ‡ation-contingent securities. 1 The model described below assumes that the pricing relationship (6) holds for synthetic in ‡ation securities at all maturities, n. That is, there are no arbitrage opportunities trading combinations of securities at di¤erent horizons. It is straightforward to show that if no arbitrage prevails in the nominal and real bond markets, no arbitrage opportunities exist for in ‡ation compensation.
An a¢ ne factor model
The model of the term structure employed here is based upon a model proposed by Du¢ e (2002) with three latent factors, using the factor normalisation implemented by Kim and Orphanides (2005) . As stated above, it assumes that equation (6) prices all in ‡ation compensation returns and that the time-series behaviour of the in ‡ation compensation yield curve can be described by three underlying latent factors. The presentation of the model follows closely that found in Kim and Wright (2005) .
Assume that the stochastic discount factor, M IC t , is speci…ed as an a¢ ne function of a 3 1 vector of latent factors, X t , and evolves in a manner that mirrors equations (5) and (6):
where r t is the instantaneous rate of in ‡ation, t is a 3 1 vector, and r t and t are a¢ ne functions of the factors,
1 That is, Et The coe¢ cient 0 is a scalar, and 0 are 3 1 vectors, is a 3 3 matrix and the vector of latent factors evolves as a continuous-time analogue of a vector autoregression
where K and are 3 3 coe¢ cient matrices and the shock " t is a three element vector of Brownian motions. To achieve identi…cation, K is transformed to be lower triangular and to a diagonal matrix, = diag( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ).
The interpretation of equation (7) is that the growth rate of the stochastic discount factor re ‡ects a risk-free in ‡ation expectation plus an adjustment for the sources of risk in the model: the shocks, " t , and elements of t , which are the time-varying market prices of those risks. In contrast to the Fisher hypothesis, which interprets the spread between nominal and real interest rates as an implied in ‡ation expectation, this model explicitly allows for a time-varying in ‡ation risk premium. The in ‡ation risk premium is comprised of term risk (the risk associated with uncertainty about future in ‡ation rates), default risk, and liquidity risk. 2 As the markets for nominal and indexed government debt in the United Kingdom are default-free and su¢ ciently liquid, risk due to uncertainty about future in ‡ation rates is likely to be the primary driver of the in ‡ation risk premium. Other factors unrelated to in ‡ation expectations may at times a¤ect in ‡ation compensation, such as changes in demand for indexed debt induced by institutional reform, tax issues or convexity.
These are not identi…ed separately and to the extent that they do not conform to the estimated dynamics of the instantaneous in ‡ation rate are largely attributed to the risk premium. 3
The model permits tractable and nonnegative bond prices. Substituting equations (7), 2 Liquidity in the indexed gilt market is high by international standards. Since its inception in the early 1980s, the share of gilt issuance that is indexed-linked has risen gradually from 17 percent in …scal year 1992-93 to 26 percent in 2005-06 (United Kingdom Debt Management O¢ ce). Turnover in the indexed-gilt market is about one …fth that in the nominal gilt market (reported in McGrath and Windle, 2006) but given the maturity and size of the U.K. market, liquidity premia are likely to be very small. By way of comparison, in the less mature and lower volume U.S. TIPS market, the liquidity premium is estimated to be at most 5 to 10 basis points (D'Amico, Kim and Wei, 2006) . There is also an indexation-lag risk premium implicit in the yield on index-linked gilts but previous research, namely Risa (2001) , has found that this premium is small and varies within a narrow range of just a few basis points. 3 The convexity e¤ect in this type of model is constant over time and varies only by maturity (see Joyce and Lildholdt, 2006) . Whether it is imputed to expected in ‡ation or risk premia will not a¤ect time variation of either of these components.
(8), (9) and (10) into the asset-pricing equation (6) yields
where a n and b n are functions of the structural parameters of the model: 0 ; 1 ; v 0 ; v 1 ; and n 2 j o 3
j=1
. Yields are thus a¢ ne functions of the three latent factors,
as are forward rates, expected future short rates and term premia. The model can be written in state-space form, with measurement equation
where y t is a q 1 vector of zero-coupon yields of maturities n 1 ; n 2 :::n q ; a = a n 1 ; a n 2 :::a nq 0 ;
B is a 3 q matrix, the i th column of which is b n i and t is a vector of measurement errors, assumed to be Gaussian. The transition equation is
where " t N (0; R 1 0 e Ks 0 e K 0 s ds), a discrete time version of equation (10). The model is estimated by maximum likelihood and the structural parameters recovered as functions of the reduced-form parameters a n and b n . It is then straightforward to construct expected in ‡ation at any horizon by forecasting the factors and substituting into equation (8). The forward in ‡ation risk premium at a given horizon is then constructed as the …tted forward rate less expected in ‡ation. The model can be …tted to monthly, weekly or daily data.
Estimation and Results

Data
I estimate the model using zero-coupon in ‡ation compensation yields provided by the Bank of England. In ‡ation compensation is calculated as the spread between the nominal and real zero-coupon yield curves, smoothed using the Bank of England's preferred spline-based method and, in the case of the real yield curve, adjusted for the indexation lag on indexlinked gilts; see Anderson and Sleath (2001) for details. 4 The estimation sample consists of monthly data from October 1992 to May 2007, the sample start date coinciding with the announcement of the Bank of England's …rst in ‡a-tion target. The sample range deliberately captures the period during which the Bank of England actively pursued an in ‡ation-targeting policy with an in ‡ation objective at or close to 2.5 percent RPIX in ‡ation-or its expected equivalent for CPI in ‡ation-lessening concern about structural change in long-run policy objectives during the estimation period. The shortest-maturity yield available over the whole sample is 4 years, so the model is estimated with yields of maturity 4, 5, 6, 10 and 15 years (data shown in Figure 1 ).
The lack of short-maturity data makes the model better suited to address questions about long-run in ‡ation expectations and risk premia. While one can construct a …tted term structure of short-maturity yields and forward rates using the parameters estimated from longer-maturity yields, the …t is likely to be worse at short horizons. Once estimated, the parameters describing the term structure can be used to …t the model to higher-frequency data, such as daily or weekly, which will prove valuable in analysing the market reaction to changes in Bank of England policy.
Principal components analysis of the …ve yields in the data set suggests that the data are well described by three factors (accounting for 99.99 percent of the variance) but could be modelled with two (the …rst two principal components account for 99.73 percent of the variance). As is commonly found in the literature, the …rst principal component seems to proxy for level of the term structure of interest rates, in this case the level of in ‡ation 4 The Bank of England's smoothed yield curves are publicly available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yieldcurve/. Results of a two-factor model estimated over the same sample period are shown in Figure 8 at the end of the paper, but the speci…cation is not able to meet the stylised facts of in ‡ation expectations in the United Kingdom. Speci…cally, two factors are insu¢ cient to capture the long-run dynamics of in ‡ation compensation, with a deterioration in root mean square error particularly for long-maturity yields (see column 3 of Table 2 at the end of the paper) and overly-fast mean reversion of the most persistent factor.
Estimation
The three-factor state-space model outlined in Section 2.2 is estimated with maximum likelihood; parameter estimates and …t diagnostics are shown in Table 2 at the end of the paper. The model assumes that the latent factors are stationary processes and accordingly, the instantaneous expected future in ‡ation rate reverts to its long-run mean, 0 , as maturity increases. Risk premia also revert to a stationary mean, as they are functions of the same three latent factors, but the estimated factor loadings result in a much slower rate of mean reversion. When estimated, the most persistent factor has annual persistence of 0.853, equivalent to a half-life of about four and half years. Mean reversion of this factor is su¢ ciently gradual that the model can accommodate much of the reduction in the level of in ‡ation compensation over the sample. 5 And because risk premia and expected in ‡ation both place some loading on this factor, they too can be far from their means for long periods.
A question of persistence
Estimates of persistence in time-series models are known to be biased downwards in small samples and this bias becomes more pronounced as the stationary series approaches a random walk (see Shaman and Stine, 1988, among others) . Given that we have only 15 years of data with which to estimate the dynamics of the factors, it is likely that persistence, especially that of the most persistent factor, is underestimated. Such downward bias imparts too much mean reversion to long-run in ‡ation expectations and, as a result, too much movement to far-horizon risk premia.
This small-sample estimation problem is not unique to the term-structure estimation in this paper. Kim and Orphanides (2005) In light of the downward bias problem, I re-estimate the model restricting the persistence of the most persistent factor to its median unbiased estimate based upon Monte Carlo simulations of a …rst-order autoregressive process. 6 Given the original estimate of annual 5 Indeed it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the factor contains a unit root using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
6 Speci…cally, ten thousand simulations are performed of a …rst-order, univariate autoregressive process with the sample length equivalent to monthly data from October 1992 to May 2007. The factor being restricted is the …rst, which, given the lower triangular nature of the coe¢ cient matrix , is orthogonal to Because of its coherence with survey evidence, the restricted model is preferred and will be the basis of discussion from here on. However, the two speci…cations tell qualitatively and, to a large extent, quantitatively similar stories about the evolution of in ‡ation expectations and risk premia, so the choice of model does not detract from the bigger picture.
Fitted decompositions from the unrestricted model are shown in Figure 6 at the end of the paper.
Expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation risk premia during the in ‡ation-targeting years
Most of the steep decline in far-forward in ‡ation compensation between late 1992 and 1998 is attributable to a reduction in in ‡ation risk premia. The upper panel of Figure 4 plots …tted instantaneous forward in ‡ation compensation eight years ahead, alongside the model's decomposition into expected in ‡ation and risk premia at that horizon. Eight-year ahead in ‡ation expectations match closely the six-to-ten year average shown in Figure 2 ;
forward rates at more maturities are shown in Figure 7 at the end of the paper.
During the early years of in ‡ation targeting, far forward rates of in ‡ation compensation declined about 3 percentage points, of which two percentage points are estimated to have Turning to the lower panel of Figure 4 , which plots in ‡ation compensation and its components at the two-year horizon, two features stand out. First, more of the movement in in ‡ation compensation is attributed to expected in ‡ation. This is intuitive given the shorter forecast horizon, where business cycle ‡uctuations are likely to be played out. From late 1992 to early 1998, two-year ahead in ‡ation expectations declined by about 2 percentage points (from just under 5 percent to just under 3 percent), which accords well with the decline in near-term survey forecasts of RPIX in ‡ation over the same period. 7 The second notable feature is that short-run in ‡ation risk premia have shown no systematic trend over the 15 years since the introduction of in ‡ation targeting, unlike long-horizon in ‡ation risk premia which trended down noticeably. In terms of their magnitude, long-maturity risk premia fell but it appears that as the Bank of England earned credibility in its commitment to in ‡ation targeting, the greatest reductions in perceptions of risk concerned long-run in ‡ation rather than the near-term outlook.
Short-maturity term premia have at times been quite variable, with the episode between January 1999 and January 2001 likely owing to the Minimum Funding Requirement for pension funds which came into e¤ect during the late 1990s, and the threat of further reforms.
Pension funds, which hold either directly or indirectly about one half of index-linked gilts, sharply increased their demand for indexed government debt at desirable maturities, raising forward in ‡ation compensation dramatically at some horizons (and narrowing forward rates at very long horizons). Reassuringly, the model attributes very little of this movement to expected in ‡ation, which accords well with the interpretation of developments at the time (Clews, 2002) .
Changes in the practice of in ‡ation targeting
Numerous researchers have argued that clarity, transparency and commitment by a central bank to its in ‡ation objectives should help to anchor in ‡ation expectations. Adjustments of the Bank of England's in ‡ation-targeting policies o¤er natural experiments to assess these claims. The term-structure model described above-…tted to high-frequency data-makes it possible to observe how …nancial market participants' long-run in ‡ation expectations and perceptions of risk responded to those adjustments. A short appendix at the end of the paper gives the chronology of re…nements to the Bank of England's policies, and the following section addresses three major changes that have occurred.
Announcement of the in ‡ation target and its early years
The Bank of England announced its …rst in ‡ation target on 8 th October, 1992, a range target between 1 and 4 percent as measured by annual RPIX in ‡ation. Forward rates of in ‡ation compensation …ve to ten years ahead declined about 30 basis points over the following two days, 20 basis points of which appear to have been a reduction in the in ‡ation risk premium. However, both in ‡ation expectations and risk premia were fairly volatile early in the sample and these moves were quickly eroded. Over the following …ve years, long-run in ‡ation expectations did drift down gradually from about 3.5 percent to 3 percent, while the in ‡ation risk premium moved in a 1 to 2 percent band (Table 1 reports end-of-year observations and selected averages). On 14 th June, 1995, the rede…nition of the target to 2.5 percent or less annual RPIX in ‡ation elicited little market reaction on the day, although near-term in ‡ation expectations and risk premia appeared to decline somewhat in subsequent months. Figure 4 .
Independence
The announcement on 6 th May, 1997 of the granting of operational independence of the Bank of England and the creation of the MPC was met by a sharp decline in forward rates of in ‡ation compensation at both short and long horizons, an event also noted by Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) and Geraats, Eij¢ nger, and van der Cruijsen (2006) To the extent that market participants expect CPI and RPIX in ‡ation to covary closely in the future (around their respective means), a CPI in ‡ation target of 2 percent is an e¤ective anchor for RPIX in ‡ation and a good long-run guide to RPI in ‡ation. 10 However, as pointed out in o¢ cial communications at the time, the formulae are not the only di¤er-ence between the two in ‡ation measures, with the inclusion of several house-price related components likely to make the gap between CPI and RPIX in ‡ation volatile.
Thus, in the switch to the CPI in ‡ation target, two additional sources of risks to RPI in ‡ation emerged. First, even were both RPIX and CPI in ‡ation expected to return to known, respective means, the central bank had ceased to promise to address persistent deviations of RPIX in ‡ation from its mean. Second, the expected trend rates of growth of CPI and RPIX in ‡ation could drift apart permanently. Compositional di¤erences could accentuate the formula e¤ect and long-lived trends in housing-related components could drive a wedge between the two measures, greater than had previously been the case be- 
